Copy of a Letter, said to be written by Lord George Murray, or one of his Friends, 1746

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429 (429)
Copy of a Letter, said to be
written by Lord George Murray,
or One of his Friends 1746.

In Answer to what you write about
the Highland Army having not behaved
with their usual Bravery, or that some of
their principal Officers had not done
their Duty, which might be the Occasion
of their late Misfortune, I must inform
You, by all I can learn, the Men shew-
edshowed the utmost Eagerness to come to Ac-
tion, nor did I hear of any one Officer
but behaved well, so far as the Situa-
tion &and Circumstances would allow.
The Truth seems to be, that they were
overpowered by a superioursuperior Force, &and their
Field of Battle was ill chosen, which
gave the Duke of Cumberland great
Advantages, especially in his Canon &and
Horse. Another Misfortune they lay un-
der, was, a total Want of Provisions,
so that they were reduced to the hard
Necessity either of fighting an Army
a third stronger, or to starve, or dis-
perse. — As to what happened the
Day of the Battle &and the preceedingpreceding
Day, I shall let you know what I could 430 (430)
could learn.

On the fifteenth, all those of the High-
land Army, as were assembled, were drawn
up in Line of Battle upon a Moor South
from Culloden facing Eastward. This
was done early in the Morning, as it was
known, that the Duke of Cumberland
was come to Nairn the Night before;
but, as he did not move before Mid-day,
it was judged, he would not march that
Day, it being his Birth-day; and, as his
Troops had made no Halt from yethe Time
he left Aberdeen, it was reasonable
to think, he would give them a Day's
Rest. It was then proposed to make
a Night-attack upon the Duke of
Cumberland's Army in their Camp,
which, if it could be done before one
or two o' Clock in the Morning, might
(though a desperate Attempt) have
had a Chance of succeeding. Seve-
ral of the Officers listened to this,
as they knew the Duke of Cumber-
land was much superior to the High-
land Army. The Objection to it was,
that a great many of the Army had ~~not~~
not as yet joined, particularly Keppoch,
the Master of Lovat, Cluny, Glengyle,
the Mackenzies, &and many of the Re-cruits431(431)
cruits of Glengary, &and other Regiments,
which were all expected in two or
three Days, &and some of them sooner; that,
if they should fail in the Attempt and
be repulsed, it would not be easy ral-
lying the Highlanders in the Dark; that,
if the Duke of Cumberland was alarm’dalarmed
by any of his Patrollers, he might have
Time to put his Army in Order in the
Camp (I suppose, no Spy should give
timely Notice) &and place his Canon charg-
ed with CartouchCartouche Shot, as he had a
Mind, &and his Horse might be all in Rea-
diness, so as to pursue, if the Highland-
ers had been beat off; &and lastly, the
Difficulty of making their Retreat with
perhaps a good many wounded Men,
whom the Highlanders will never
leave, be it possible to bring them off.
It is to be remarked, that there was
no Intelligence of the Enemy's Camp.
Add to this, how fatiguing it would be
to march backwards &and forwards twenty
Miles, &and probably be obliged to fight
next Day, even could they make their
Retreat safe, &and not be attacked before
they joined the Rest of the Army.

On the other Hand, the Prince was
vastly bent for the Night-attack, &and said, he 432 (432)
he had Men enow1 to beat the Enemy,
whom he believed utterly dispirited, &and
would never stand a bold &and brisk Attack.
The Duke of Perth, Lord John Drum-
mond, with others, seemed to wish it,
&and Lord George Murray, Lochgary, with
many others, were induced to make a
fair Trial what could be done, though
they were very sensible of the Danger,
should it miscarry. They observed wtwith
much Concern the Want of Provisions.
The Men had only got that Day a
✝Biscuit each, &and some not even that.
It was feared; it would prove worse
next Day, except they could take Provisi-
ons from the Enemy, &and they had Reason
to believe, if the Men were allowed
to disperse to shift for some Meat (qchwhich
many of them would do, if the Army
continued there all Night) that it
would be very difficult to assemble
them, in the Event of a sudden Alarm,
which, considering the Nearness of the
Enemy, might very reasonably be sup-
posed; and, as they must have layenlain
that Night in the Muirs near Cullod-
en, as they had done the Night before
they knew many of them would dif-
perse, without Liberty, to several Miles

✝
Vol: 1. pag: 157. Vol: 4. p: 659

. 433 (433)
Miles Distance for Provisions &and Quar-
ters, &and that it would be far in the
Day before they could be assembled again.
And as Keppoch came up, &and joined the
Army that Afternoon, they flattered
themselves, that the Men they had
might do, if they could have made
the Attack by one or two in the Morning,
especially if they were undiscovered, as
they had great Hopes they might; for,
having examined the different Roads,
of which they had perfect Intelli-
gence from the MacIntoshes, who lived
in those very Parts, they found, they
could keep upon a Muir the whole
Way, so as to shun the Houses, &and be a
considerable Way from the High-Road,
that leads from Inverness to Nairn.
They also considered, that, in the Event
of making the Attack, should they even
be beat off without the desired Success,
they might, before Day-break, get back
the Length of ✝Culcarick, which was
very strong Ground, &and from thence by a
Hill they could retire the whole Way
on the South side of the Water of
Nairn, till they were joined by their
Friends, whom they expected, &and by the Stragglers;

✝
So the Copy had it, but I think it
should be Culraick.

Robert Forbes A: M:
434 (434)
Stragglers: Nor did they believe, the
Enemy would follow them (suppose the
Highlanders were beat back) till it
were good Day-light, so as they could
see about them, &and send out reconnoit-
ering Parties to prevent their falling
into Ambuscades &and Snares; and, be-
fore all this could be done, the High-
land Army might have reached ^ ^Culraick~~Cul~~
~~carick~~ &and the hilly Ground on the South
side of the Water above-mentioned,
where regular Troops could not easily
overtake them, &and where their Canon
&and Horse (in which their greatest
Superiority consisted) would have
been of little Use. That they found,
the Prince was resolved to fight the
Enemy without waiting for the Suc-
cours, that were soon expected, &and
without retiring to any strong Ground,
or endeavouring to draw the Duke of
Cumberland’s Army farther from
the Sea, from whence he got all
his Provisions, that was brought about
in Ships, which sailed along it, as
his Army marched near the Shore.

For these Reasons them Gentle-
men &and most others, if not all, who
were spoke to upon the Subject, seem-ed435(435)
ed to think, the Night-Attack might
be attempted; but most of them thought,
they were in ^very bad Circumstances at
any Rate, &and no attempt could be more
desperate than their present Situation.
Lord George Murray, about Mid-day,
desired Brigadier Stapleton &and Colo-
nel Ker to cross the Water of Nairn
near where the Army was drawn up
(not far from the Place where the
Battle was fought next Day) to take
a View of the Hill-Ground on the
South side of the Water, which to him
appeared to be steep &and uneven, con-
sequently much properer for High-
landers; for the Ground, they were
then drawn up upon, was a large plain
Muir, &and though in some Places it was
interspersed with BoguesBogs &and deep Ground,
yet, for the most Part, it was a fair
Field, &and good for Horse. After two
or three Hours, they returned, &and re-
ported, that the Ground was rough
&and rugged, mossy &and soft, so that no
Horse could be of Use there; that
the Ascent from the Water-side
was steep, &and that there was but about
two or three Places in about three
or four Miles, where Horse could cross, 436 (436)
cross, the Banks being inaccessible.
They could not tell what Sort of
Ground was at a greater Distance;
but the Country People informed
them, it was much like the other.
Upon this Information Lord George
Murray proposed, that the other Side
of the Water should be the Place
for the Army to be drawn up in Line
of Battle next Day; but this was
not agreed to. It was said, it was
like shunning the Enemy, being a
Mile further from the Muir they were
then upon, &and at a greater Distance
from Inverness, which it was re-
solved not to abandon, a great deal
of Baggage &and Ammunition being left
there. This was before the Resolu-
tion was taken of making the
Night-Attack. About seven at Night
an Incident happened, which had
like to have stoptstopped their designed
Attempt, &and upon it many were for
giving it up as impracticable. The
Thing was this. Numbers of Men
went off to all Sides, especially to-
wards Inverness, &and when the Officers
who were sent on Horseback to bring
them back, came up with them, they could 437 (437)
could by no Persuasion be induced to
return again, giving for Answer, they
were starving, &and said to the Officers,
they might shoot them if they pleased,
but they could not go back till they
got Meat. But the Prince continued
keen for the Attack, &and positive to at-
tempt it, &and said, there was not a Mo-
ment to be lost; for as soon as the
Men should see the March begun,
not one of them would flinch. It
was near Eight at Night, when they
moved, which could not be sooner,
otherwise they might have been per-
ceived at a considerable Distance,
&and the Enemy have got Account of
their March. Lord George Murray
was in the Van, Lord John Drum-
mond in the Centre, &and the Duke
of Perth towards the Rear, where
also the Prince was, having Fitz
James's Horse &and others with him.
Proper Directions were given for
small Parties possessing all yethe Roads,
that Intelligence might not be car-
ried to the Enemy. There were a-
bout two Officers &and thirty Men of
the MacIntoshes in the Front as Guides,
&and some of the same were in the Centre, 438 (438)
Centre, &and Rear, &and in other Parts, for
hindering any of the Men from strag-
gling. Before the Van had gone a
Mile, which was as slow as could be
to give Time to the Line to follow,
there was Express after Express
sent to stop them, for that the Rear
was far behind. Upon this the Van
marched still slower; but in a short
Time there came AidAide de Camps
&and other Officers to stop them, or at
least to make them go slower; &and
of these Messages, I am assured, yrethere
came near an hundred, before the
Front got near Culraick, which re-
tarded them to such a Degree, ytthat
the Night was far spent; for from
the Place, the Army began to march,
to Culraick was but six Miles, and
they had still four long Miles to
Nairn. It was now about One o' Clock
in the Morning, when Lord John
Drummond came up to the Van, &and
told, there were severals far
behind, and, if they did not stop
or go slower, he was afraid, the
Rear would not get up. In a little
Time the Duke of Perth came also to 439 (439)
to the Front, &and assured, that if there
was not a Halt, the Rear could not
join. There was a Stop accordingly.
Lochiel had been mostly in yethe Van
all Night, &and his Men were next the
Athol-men, who were in the Front.
These two Bodies made about twelve
hundred Men. There were also seve-
ral other Officers, that came up, there
being a Defile a little Way behind,
occasioned by a Wall of the Wood of
Culraick, which also retarded the
March of those that were behind.
The Officers, talking of the different
Places of making the Attack, said, it
was better to make the Attempt with
four thousand Men before Day-break,
as with double the Number after
it was Light. Mr O Sullivan now
having come up to the Front, &and it
being now evident by the Time the
Army had taken to march little more
than six Miles, it would be impossi-
ble to make the other Part of the
Road, which was about four Miles,
before it was clear Day-light; be-
sides the Time, that must be spent
in making the Disposition for the Attack, 440 (440)
Attack, as it could not be done by yethe
Army in the Line by their long March.
Mr O Sullivan said, he had just then
come from the Prince, who was very
desirous the Attack should be made;
but as Lord George Murray had the
Van, &and could judge the Time, he left
it to him whether to do it or not.
There were several Volunteers pre-
sent, who had walked all Night in
the Front, such as, Mr Hepburn,
Mr Hunter, Mr Anderson, &and others;
&and as the Duke of Perth, Lord John
Drummond, &and other Officers seem'dseemed
to be much difficulted what to re-
solve upon, Lord George Murray de-
sired the rest of the Gentlemen to
give their Opinions, for they were
all deeply concerned in the Conse-
quence. It was agreed upon all
Hands, that it must be Sun-rise be-
fore the Army could reach Nairn,
&and form so, as to make an Attempt upon
the Enemy's Camp; for one Part was
to have passed the Water a Mile
above the Town to have fallen u-
pon them towards the Sea-side. The
Volunteers were all very keen to march. 441 (441)
march. Some of them said, that the
Red-coats would be all drunk, as
they surely had solemnized the Duke
of Cumberland’s Birth-day, and that,
though it were Day-light, they would
be in such Confusion they would not
withstand the Highlanders.

This Opinion shewedshowed Abundance of
Courage; for these Gentlemen would
have been in the first Rank, had
there been any Attack: But the Of-
ficers were of different Senti-
ments, as severals of them ex-
pressed. ✝ Lochiel &and his Brother said,
they had been as much for the Night-
Attack as any Body could be, &and it
was not their Fault that it had
not been done; but blamed those
in the Rear, that had marched so
slow, &and retarded the rest of the
Army. Lord George Murray was of
the same Way of thinking, &and said,
if they could have made the Attack,
it was the best Chance they had,
especially if they could have sur-
prizedsurprised the Enemy. But to attack
a Camp, that was near double their
Number in Day-light, when they would be

✝
Vol: 1. p: 158. Vol: 4. p: 661. Vol: 6. p: 1270.
442 (442)
be prepared to receive them, would
be perfect Madness.

By this Time Mr John Hay came up,
&and told, the Line was joined. He was
told, the Resolution was taken to
return. He began to argue upon
the Point; but no Bodynobody minded
him. This was the Gentleman the
Army blamed for the Distress they
were in for Want of Provisions, he
having had the Superintendency
of all these Things from the Time
of Mr Murray's Illness, who had
always been extremely active in
whatsoever regarded the providing
for the Army. It was about two o’
Clock in the Morning (the Halt be-
ing not above a Quarter of an Hour)
when they went back in two Columns,
the Rear facing about, &and the Van
taking another Way. At a little
Distance they had a View of the
Fires of the Duke of Cumberland’s
Camp, and, as they did not shun
passing near Houses, as they had
done in advancing, they marched
very quick. Day-light began to ap-
pear in about an Hour after. They got 443 (443)
got to Culloden pretty early, so that
the Men had three or four Hours Rest.
They killed what Cattle or Sheep they
could find; but few of them had Time
to make any Thing ready, before the
Alarm came of the Enemy's being u-
pon their March &and approaching. The
Horse of the Prince's Army had been
all on such hard Duty for several
Days &and nights before, that none
them were fit for patroling. At that ^Time
Fitz James's Horse &and several others
had gone to Inverness to refresh;
so at first it was not known, whether
it was an advanced Party or the
Duke of Cumberland’s whole Ar-
my. However, the Highlanders got
ready as quick as possible, &and march-
ed through the Parks of Culloden
in Battalions (just as they chanced
to be lying) to the Muir on the
South side, facing eastwards, &and about
half a Mile farther back, than where
they had been drawn up the Night
before. Lord George Murray proposed
once more to pass the Water of Nairn,
as being the strongest Ground, &and much
the fitter for Highlanders. Cluny, who was 444 (444)
was expected every Moment, was to
come on that Side; but it was not a-
greed upon for the same Reason
given the Day before. Lord George
speaking to Mr O Sullivan, he told
him, that he was afraid, the Enemy
would have great Advantage in
that plain Muir, both in their Horse
&and Canon. But he (O Sullivan) an-
swered, that he was sure, Horse
could be of no Use, because there
were several BoguesBogs &and Morasses;
but the Event proved otherwise.
Mr O Sullivan drew up the Army
in Line of Battle (he being both
AdjutentAdjutant &and Quarter Master General)
&and having shown every Battalion yrtheir
Place; the Right closed to some In-
closuresEnclosures near the Water of Nairn,
&and the Left towards the Parks of
Culloden. I cannot justly tell qtwhat
Order they were drawn up in. There
had been some Disputes, a Day
or two before, about their Rank; but
no Bodynobody, that had any Regard for yethe
common Cause, would insist upon
such Things upon that Occasion.
Those, who had give off the Night be-fore445(445)
fore &and early that Morning to Inver-
ness &and other Parts, had now joined,
&and the Master of Lovat was come up
with a considerable Recruit of his
Men. It was observed, that upon the
Right there were Park-walls, un-
der Cover of which so many of the
Enemy could draw up &and flank the
Highlanders. Lord George Murray,
who commanded that Wing, was very
desirous to have advanced &and thrown
them down; but as this would have
broke the Line, &and the Enemy form-
ing their Line of Battle near that
Place, it was judged by those about
him too dangerous to attempt.
Both Armies being fully formed,
the Canonading began on both
Sides, after which there was some
small Alteration made in the
Disposition of the two Armies, by
bringing Troops from the second Line
to the first, as both the Ends advan-
ced to out-flank one another. The
Highlanders were much galled by
the Enemy's Canon, &and were turned
so impatient, that they were like to break 446 (446)
break their Ranks; upon which it was
judged proper to attack, &and Orders were
given accordingly. The Right Wing ad-
vanced first, as the whole Line did
much at the same Time. The left
Wing did not attack the Enemy, at
least did not go in Sword in hand,
imagining they would be flanked
by a Regiment of Foot &and some Horse,
which the Enemy brought up at ytthat
Time from their second Line or Corps
de Reserve. When the Right Wing
were within Pistol-shot of the Ene-
my, they received a most terrible
Fire not only in Front but also in
Flank, by Reason of those that were
posted near the Stone-walls; not-
withstanding of which they went
on Sword in Hand, after giving
their Fire close to the Enemy, &and
were received by them with their
Spantoons &and Bayonets. The two Regi-
ments of Foot, that were upon the
Enemy's Left, would have been cut
in Pieces, had they not been imme-
diately supported by other two Re-
giments from their second Line. As
it was, these two Regiments (being Barrel’s 447 (447)
Barrel's &and that called Monroe's) had,
by their own Confession, above two
hundred Men killed &and wounded.
Two Regiments of Dragoons, coming
in upon the same Side, entirely
broke that Wing of the Highlanders;
&and though three Battalions of yethe Right
of the second Line were brought
up, &and gave their Fire very well,
yet the Ground &and every Thing else
was so favourable for the Enemy,
that Nothing could be done, but a to-
tel Route ensued.

I am positively informed, that the
Highland Army did not consist of
above seven ✝ thousand ^fighting Men, &and that
the Duke of Cumberland's must
have been ten or twelve thousand.
In the one Army there were not a-
bove an hundred &and fifty Horse, of
which one Half was of the Regi-
ment of Fitz James's. In the other
Army they had eleven or twelve hun-
dred.

When a Misfortune happens, People
are apt to throw the Blame upon
Persons or Causes, which frequently
are either the Effects of Malice or Ignorance,

✝
Vol: 1. pag: 128. Vol: 6. pag: 1275. 448 (448)
Ignorance, without knowing the real
Springs &and Motives. Severals are
of Opinion, that the Night-attack
could have been made; but I am
convinced of the Contrary for the
following Reasons. The Highland
Army, when they halted near Cul-
raick, were not above five thous-
and Men. They had four Miles to
march, &and Part of them were obliged
to have made a considerable Cir-
cumference, so that it would have
been Sun-rise before they could have
made the Attack. The Ground about
Nairn, where the Enemy lay encam-
ped, was a hard dry Soil &and plain
Muirs three Miles round about, ex-
cept where the Sea intervened; the
nearest strong &and uneven Ground
being the Wood of Culraick. Let
it be supposed, the Highlanders had
made an Attack, in broad Day-light,
upon an Enemy double their Num-
ber, in their Camp, who were well
refreshed with a Day &and two Nights
Rest, with Plenty of all Kinds of
Provisions, with their Canon pointed
as they thought proper, their Horse
drawn up to their Wish in a fine Plain, what 449 (449)
what must the Consequence have been?
What would have been said of Offi-
cers, that led on Men in such Circum-
stances &and such a Situation? Would it
not have been certain Death &and Destru-
tion of all those, that made the At-
tack? Would it not have been said,
&and justly said, Why go You on in such a
desperate Attempt, seeing it could not
be done by SurprizeSurprise, &and undiscovered,
as projected? Why not try the Chance
of a fair Battle, by returning, &and being
joined by the rest of the Army, as well
as by those, who had withdrawn the Night
before, &and a great many others, who were
hourly expected; where also they might
have Canon, &and Choice of the Field of
Battle? By this Means there was a
fair Chance, by others there was none.

As to the above-mentioned Facts,
you may rely upon them. I saw the
Duke of Perth, the Duke of Athol,
Lord John Drummond, Lord George
Murray, Lord Ogilvie, Colonel Stew-
art of Ardshiel, Colonel Roy Stewart,
Lord Nairn, &and several others, at Ruth-
ven of Badenoch, on the Friday, two
Days after the Battle; &and they all a-greed450(450)
greed on the same Things.

One Thing I must take Notice of, ytthat,
from the Beginning of the whole Af-
fair, there never had been the least
Dispute ✝ or Misunderstanding among
the Officers. Some find Fault, that
the Night-march was undertaken, see-
ing there was not a Certainty of march-
ing to Nairn time enough to make the
Attack before Day-light, as also that
they had too few Men.

In Answer to this; It was not doubted,
when the March was begun, but that
there would be Abundance of Time.
Their greatest Precaution was, not to
be discovered. The Highlanders had
often made very quick Marches in
the Night-time. The French Piquets,
I believe, were in the Rear, &and were
not so clever in marching, &and the Muir
they went through was more splashy
than they expected, &and they were o-
bliged to make some Turns to shun
Houses, &and there were two or three
Dykes, that took up a good deal
of Time to pass. The Guides, though they

✝
I am afraid, this is not Fact; for Disputes
&and Canglings2 arose even in the AbbayAbbey at E-
dinburgh, &and I have heard some affirm, who had
an Opportunity of knowing that these were
owing to the haughty, restless, unaccountable
Temper of Lord George Murray, some of
whose
451 (451)
they knew the Ground very well, yet, were
not Judges to tell what Time it would
take to march the ten Miles, as they
were called, though, by Reason of the
indirect Road, must be more. Notwith-
standing of all this, I am persuaded,
most of the Army (had not the Van
been frequently stoptstopped &and retarded by
repeated Orders &and Messages) would
have been at Nairn by two o' Clock
in the Morning. As for the Number
of Men, though not half that of
the Enemy, they might very probab-
ly have succeeded in the Attempt,
had they made the Attack undis-
covered. Nothing is more uncertain
than the Events of War. Night-At-
tacks are most subject to Disappoint-
ments. This March &and Counter-march,
to be sure, was, as Things turned out,
a great Disadvantage. It fatigued
the Men much, &and a Council of War
might have been obtained, in which,
doubtless, a Resolution would have
been taken to chusechoose a more advantag-
eous Field of Battle, &and perhaps post-pon’d

[w]hose Blood-Relations fail not to lay Blame
[u]pon him. Witness likewise the Contest in the
[A]bbayAbbey betwixt Keppoch &and Lochiel about the Right
[H]and, before they went out to fight Cope, a
[p]articular Account of qchwhich Dispute I had from Ma-
[jo]r MacDonell in yethe Castle of Edr.Edinburgh.

Robert Forbes, A: M:
452(452)
pon’d fighting for a Day, till the Suc-
cours, that were coming up with the
utmost Expedition, should join. Coun-
cils of War were seldom held, &and ✝ were
out of Request from the Time yethe Army
marched into England. I remember
but of two that were held, the One
at Brampton, in Regard of besieging
Carlisle, or going to attack General
Wade. The other was at Carlisle,
where it was resolved to march for-
wards. What happened at Derby
was accidental by most of the Offic-
ers being at the Prince’s Quarters,
and, taking into Consideration their
Situation, they were all unanimous
in advising the Prince to retreat.
I think, there was but one Council
of War called, after they returned to
Scotland, &and that was near Crieff the Day

✝
No Wonder, that Councils of War
were out of Request, when the Prince
was always thwarted in them, &and hardly
got his Will in any Thing he proposed,
though his Opinion of Things, in the
Event, turned out to be the most eligi-
ble. Lord George Murray was at the
Head of the Opposition, having got
the Ascendant of the greater Part
of the ChiftainsChieftains, &and having insinuated
himself into the good Graces of all the
453 (453)
Day after the Retreat from Stirling,
where there was some Difference of Opi-
nion; but it was at last agreed to march
for Inverness in two separate Bodies,
the One the Highland Road, &and the
Other by the Coast, severals at first
being for the Army all going one
Road. The Day of the Battle of
Falkirk the Officers were called on
[t]he Field, where the Army was drawn
up betwixt Bannockburn &and the Tor-
wood, &and they all agreed immediate-
ly to march to the Enemy. Also the
Retreat from Stirling, it was advised
by many of the principal Officers, par-
ticularly the Clans. They drew up the
Reasons, &and sign'dsigned them, at Falkirk,
three Days before the Retreat was
made; the Chief of which was, that
a vast Number of Men had gone
off after the Battle, &and were not re-
turned, and, that the Siege of Stir-
ling-Castle was not advancing,
they did not think it advisable to
fight in such Circumstances.
This

[t]he Clans, who were ever ready to embrace
[h]is Schemes. Besides, it was most unlucky,
[t]hat great Jealousies &and Misunderstandings
[h]ad arisen betwixt Lord George Murray
[&and] the French Officers. These Things are
[to]o notour,3 to admit of any Denial.

Robert Forbes, A: M:
454 (454)
This Letter has been much longer
than I intended; but, before I conclude,
I must acquaint You, that, six Weeks
before the Battle of Culloden, some
Officers proposed sending up Meal to
several Parts of the Highlands,
and, in particular, to Badenoch;
that, in the Event of the Duke
of Cumberland’s ^Army marching towards
Inverness before the Army was ga-
thered, they might retreat for a few
Days, till they could assemble; or,
if a Misfortune should happen by a
Defeat, there might be some Pro-
visions in these Parts. But this
was reckoned a timorous Advice,
&and rejected as such; though I have
Reason to believe, that the Opini-
on of mostly all the Highland
Officers was much the same. They
were not for precipitating any Thing.
There was no Doubt, the Highland-
ers could have avoided fighting,
till they had found their Advan-
tages. In so doing, they could have
made a Summer-campaign, with-
out running the RisqueRisk of any
Misfortune. They could have
marched through the Hills to
Places in Aberdeenshire, Banfshire the 455 (455)
the Merns, Angus, Perthshire, or Ar-
gyleshire, by Ways, that no regular
Troops could have followed them;
and if the regular Troops had con-
tinued among the Mountains, they
must have been attended with great
Difficulties &and ExpenceExpense. Their Convoys
might have been cut off, &and Opportu-
nities have offered to have attacked
them with almost a Certainty of
Success. And, though the Highland-
ers had neither Money nor Magaz-
ines, they could not have starved
in that season of the Year, so long
as there were any Sheep or Cat-
tle to be had. They could also have
separated in^to two or three ^different Bodies,
got Meal for some Days Provision,
met again at a Place appointed,
&and have attacked the Enemy where
was least expected. They could have
marched in three Days, what would
have taken Regular Troops five,
[n]ay, had these taken the high Roads,
(as often they would have been o-
bliged to do upon Account of their
Carriages) it would have taken them ten 456 (456)
ten or twelve. In short, they would
have been so harrassed &and fatigued,
that they must have been in the
greatest Distress &and Difficulties, and,
at the long Run, probably been de-
stroyed. At least, Much might have
been expected by gaining of Time.
Perhaps such Succours might have
come from France, as would have
made the Highlanders to have made
an Offensive, instead of a Defen-
sive, War. This, I say, was the
Opinion of many of the Officers,
who considered the Consequences
of losing a Battle. They knew well,
that few of the Highlanders would
join heartily against them, as long
as they continued entire; but would,
upon a Defeat. There was one
great Objection to this, that the
Irish Officers, who were all ^as brave
Men &and zealous in the Cause as
possible could be, &and many of the
Low-country-men, could not en-
dure the Fatigue of a Highland
Campaign. As to the common Sol-
diers, that came from France, yrethere were 457 (457)
were not four hundred of them re-
maining. They &and their Officers, even
though a Battle was lost, had but to
surrender, &and be made Prisoners
of War. It was very different wtwith
the Scots, whose Safety depended
upon their not venturing a Battle
without great Probability of Success.
But any Proposition to postpone
Fighting was ill received, and
was called Discouraging the Army.

I have nothing further to add,
but am, &c.etc.

Leith,